7/09/2013

Market of Information Goods

When talking about the economy of information goods, we usually treat them as a single kind of commodity. Lots of articles illustrated their theory with facts in software or folk music industry but seldom clarifying the possible difference between those markets and whether other markets can apply the same theory. Varian, Farrell, and Shapiro (2005) are supporters of "copyright" which transform the information goods market into a situation where invisible hands works tolerably well, arguing that the classical economy is able to explain all about information goods. Yet, DeLong (1999) and Anderson(2010) votes for respecting the initial features of information goods - nonexcludability, nonrivalry, and nontransparency, and operating the market with a gift-exchanging mode or a free goods plus compensated service mode. Anderson even appreciated China and Brazil where the pirates are not controlled well, as the pioneer of "free", the new economy. Actually, we cannot tell who is more reasonable until clarifying the domain of each view, since a rule for the apple market is not always good for the car’s because of different attributes of demand and supply groups. So here, I divided the information goods market into 4 categories depending on their level of competence intensity within the demand group and the supply group. This segmentation helps to describe the market structures of different information goods and we can see that both Varian and DeLong can be right.

4 Kinds of Markets 

How can I have 4 kinds of market? First, I divided the supplier's group into two parts according to the potential scale of competition. For products easy to be made, like a song, their production scale is usually very small, which also results in a large number of triers and an intense competition. On the contrary, products with complicated producing process and usually also a high fixed cost have a large producing process, which built a high barriers of entry that reduce the number of competitors. Then, I divided the demands' groups, also into two parts, according to their potential scale of demand. Information goods such as games can be widely demanded since they have higher order on most people's preference list; whereas, the demand of software that focuses only on some groups, for example, kid's education, will be more elastically, which can result in a very narrow demand. Thus, we have table 1:

Table 1

Scale of Producers
Number of Participants
Small
Large
Scale of Demand
Wide
“Music”
“Operating System”
Many
Narrow
“Ads”
“Custom Made”
Scarce
Number of Participants
Many
Scarce


4 zones are formed in this table. First is small-wide zone. Both supply and demand can be plenty, the large number of participants in both sides helps the small-wide zone to become a competitive market. A typical product in this zone is a piece of pop music. Next, production becomes scarce and the scale gets large due to the limitation of a single person’s ability and the huge power of group cooperation. A barrier of entry that limits competition was formed, which can also be fortified by the complexity of the product itself since it causes users a great learning cost which lock consumers in (rf. Varian lock-in). So obviously, large-wide zone is a good place for monopoly and oligopolies. Then, if demands instead of production become less, we will switch to the small-narrow zone. Advertisement is a good example of products in this zone. Finally, when both supply and demands are small, we will enter the large-narrow zone. A customized made software belongs to this zone. This zone is proper for negotiation and investigating because of a relatively low transaction cost due to small market size.

DeLong and Froomkin(1999) concluded 3 basic features of property and exchange that makes the invisible hand a powerful social mechanism: excludability, rivalry, and transparency, which corresponds to the three basic economics assumptions in Adam Smith’s system: scarcity, individual rationality, and perfect information set. But information good, as a good whose value is contained in the information itself, cannot be transparent. Furthermore, Varian(1995) points out that information goods have such perfect copies that they can be created and distributed almost costless. This physical attribute gives information important economics features: non-excludability and non-rivalry, which violates the first two features that guarantee Adam Smith’s sysem.Worse, costless copy also make the marginal cost pricing system crash.

Since we have four different kinds of market and each with unique attributes, in the next article, I will try to put these special attributes: non-excludability, non-rivalry, and non-transparency, into them separately, and see what will happen.

See you.

References
The Economics of Information Technology, Varian, Hal R., J. Farrell, C. Shapiro, 2004, ISBN: 0521844150
Speculative Microeconomics for Tomorrow's Economy, J. B. DeLong, A. M. Froomkin, 1999, presented at Brian Kahin and Hal Varian's January 1997 Harvard Kennedy School conference  
Free: The Future of Radical Price, Anderson, C., 2010, ISBN: 9781410322908  
Copying and copyright, Varian, Hal R., The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.19, No.2, Spring, 2005  
Pricing Information Goods. Varian, H., Proceedings of Scholarship in the New Information Environment Symposium. Harvard Law School. 1995.
 
Towards a theory of property rights, Harold Demsetz, The American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 2,May, 1967, pp. 347-359.